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Comments
DUTY TO CORRECT: A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

The principal purpose of the federal securities laws is to compel
information disclosure from securities issuers. Accordingly, federal
securities law imposes mandatory obligations on issuers to speak.
The statutes and administrative rules create express affirmative disclosure obligations, while the federal common law, filling the interstices of securities regulation, contains implied affirmative
disclosure obligations. Yet existing law concerning disclosure obligations falls short of reaching the goal of full disclosure. In particular, the law has not developed cohesive rules regarding the duty to
correct authorized or unauthorized disclosure by various corporate
parties. This comment will examine the need for a duty to correct,
and will suggest a framework for such a duty, based on existing securities and tort law principles.
A.

Sources of Express and Implied Disclosure Obligations

Express affirmative disclosure obligations arising by statute and
rule include provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,' the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act), 2 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules promulgated under each act.
The disclosure system imposed by statute and administrative
rule is largely based on periodic reporting. Issuers must make substantial disclosures on a quarterly and annual basis on forms 10-Q
and 10-K, respectively. 3 Because periodic reporting allows information to accrue, large lag times develop between the occurrence of
significant events and the date of required disclosure. These lag
times frustrate the goal of full disclosure.
The express affirmative disclosure obligations that establish
current rather than periodic reporting requirements are, save one,
confined to situations in which the issuer conducts certain transac1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
3. Section 13 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982), requires issuers to file
reports with the SEC. Rule 13a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1986), requires annual reports on form 10-K; rule 13a-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (1986), requires quarterly reports on form I0-Q.
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tions in its securities, e.g., issues securities or solicits proxies.4 Only
form 8-K 5 imposes current reporting requirements for events not
involving transactions in issuer securities; but the scope of form 8-K
is exceedingly narrow. The form is required in only the most exigent of corporate circumstances: changes in control, acquisition or
disposition of a significant amount of assets, bankruptcy or receivership, changes in accountant, or resignation of directors. 6
The narrow scope of form 8-K and the corresponding void in
current reporting requirements when the issuer is not transacting in
its securities has led to the development of implied affirmative disclosure duties. 7 Two theoretical underpinnings of implied affirmative disclosure obligations are apparent. One theory concludes that
by creating an informational flow to the market, a public corporation represents, by implication, that previous disclosures remain accurate. Therefore, the corporation deceives investors, under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act' and rule lOb-5, when it permits
prior disclosures to represent present conditions, knowing that such
information is no longer accurate.' ° The second theory implies an
affirmative obligation to disclose by extending the "shingle" and
"trust and confidence" theories, applicable to broker-dealers, to securities issuers." Under this rationale, the corporation, by creating
a public market in its securities, incurs an obligation to deal fairly
with the investing public.' 2
B.

Liabilityfor Disclosures

Duties, particularly to disclose, are hortatory unless liability accompanies their failure. Failure to disclose can be actionable under
3
the federal securities laws. Section 18(a) of the Exchange Act'
grants an express private right of action to investors who have been
4. Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), requires filings in
connection with proxy statements; section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982), imposes
filing requirements in connection with tender offers.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1986).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a (1986).
7. See Bauman, Rule IOb-5 and the Corporation'sAffirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J.
935 (1979); Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule 10b-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation
Have an Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 DENVER L.J. 369 (1973).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
10. Bauman, supra note 7, at 944-45.
11. Id.
12. See M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 2.01
(1986); Bauman, supra note 7, at 944-45.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982).
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injured by reliance upon material misstatements or omissions of fact
in documents filed with the SEC, while section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 provide a cause of action for injuries due
to nondisclosures or misrepresentations other than in an SEC-filed
document.' 4 Section 10(b) actions are limited to actual purchasers
and sellers 5 who show that the defendant acted with scienter16 in
the manipulative or deceptive sale or purchase of securities.'" The
plaintiff in a section 10(b) claim must show more than a mere breach
of fiduciary duty,' 8 and must also prove damages. 19 Further, claims
that allege nondisclosure must show that the defendant was under a
duty to disclose.2"
Of these elements, deception and duty to disclose are the most
difficult to establish in a suit alleging liability for failure to meet an
affirmative disclosure obligation. The bulk of this comment will address when duties to disclose do, and should, arise by implication
under the federal securities laws. A discussion of the deception element is particularly merited in light of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Santa Fe Industries v. Green.2 ' In that case the Court
concluded that more than unfairness is required to bring an action
within section 10(b). The Court stated that absent manipulation or
deception, section 10(b) did not reach breaches of fiduciary duty.2 2
Deception is an independent element of a section 10(b) cause
of action. The element of deception requires that some benefit flow
to the defendant corporation by reason of the nondisclosure.23 The
two theories stated above of informational flow and shingle would
find that the corporation gains a benefit when trading in its securities is buoyed by misinformation. This benefit has been held sufficient to support a claim for failure to meet an implied disclosure
4
obligation under section 10(b) in the post-Santa Fe period.
14. See State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981),
aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 500 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977).
15. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
16. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
17. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
18. Id.
19. See M. STEINBERG, supra note 12, at §§ 7.01-7.07.
20. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
21. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
22. Id. at 472.
23. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1983).
24. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Ross v. A.H. Robins
Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'don othergrounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).

DUTY

19871

1253

TO CORRECT

It appears that the element of deception is satisfied by mere
failure of a duty to disclose since the corporation gains the benefit of
enhanced trading in its securities while the market is misinformed.
However, in the post-Santa Fe period the courts may determine that
some additional benefits must be shown.
This comment will focus on the single section 10(b) element of
duty to disclose, including when such duties, particularly the duty to
correct, can, and should, arise.
II.

AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED

By

IMPLICATION RATHER THAN EXPRESS MANDATE OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

Courts in several situations have recognized affirmative disclosure obligations absent express requirements.
Insider Trading. Persons who possess inside information must
disclose it before trading if they are corporate insiders or if they
have received inside information from an insider who will personally
25
benefit from the tip.
Duty to Update. Issuers are under a duty to update statements
made by them which, while true when previously made, have become misleading. 26 The duty arises because investors may reasonably rely on the continuing accuracy of the earlier statement.2 7
Duty to Correct. The duty to correct, as phrased to date, requires
issuers to correct statements not made by them but which they know
are misleading. 28 The duty to correct, while distinct from the duty
to update, is simply a logical extension of it. Analytically, the duty to
correct performs a function of logic; it deems the issuer to be the
source of information which it did not disseminate. Obviously, the
threshold issue in a duty to correct situation is the nexus between
the issuer and information source. If the issuer is deemed the
source, then a situation akin to a duty to update situation occurs: an
issuer has made an earlier statement, by attribution. If the earlier
statement was false, the issuer must correct. If the earlier statement

25. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
26. See M. STEINBERG, supra note 12, at § 2.02; Bauman, supra note 7, at 963-66.
27. See Ross v. A.H. Robins, 465 F. Supp. at 908; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (corporation can be liable for issuing a misleading press release), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (holding that the release was misleading and the company therefore violated rule
lOb-5).
28. See Bauman, supra note 7, at 966-67.
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was true, the issuer is under a continuing duty to update the attributed statements.
Duty to correct cases have not seized on the analytic symmetry
of the duty to correct and the duty to update. Rather, the duty to
correct cases have looked solely at the relationship between the issuer and the source, requiring the issuer to correct only if a sufficient relationship exists. 2 1 This view disregards the considerations
of materiality and reasonableness that are part of the duty to update.
In a duty to update case the analysis occurs in three steps. First, has
an earlier statement become false? If so, is the change material?
And, if so, are investors reasonable in relying on the continuing ac30
curacy of the earlier statement?
The second and third steps should be applied with equal force
in a duty to correct situation. After attribution is made, the situation
is identical to the duty to update. In both situations the issuer has
made a statement which is currently misleading. Just as the duty to
update analysis then proceeds to consider materiality and reasonableness of reliance, so too should duty to correct analysis.
The analysis for duty to correct situations should use the same
three steps of the duty to update with one addition, a new step one:
has the issuer made an earlier statement?
A possible differentiation of the duty to correct situation from
the duty to update is that the duty to correct, as phrased by the
courts, requires issuers to correct only attributed statements which
were misleading when made. 3 1 Under the duty to correct the statement is considered false when made, but in a duty to update the
statement is considered true when made. Although it is true that
duty to correct cases have only considered the situation in which the
statement is false when made by the attributed speaker, this is too
narrow a concept of the duty to correct. The duty to correct should
be as applicable when attributable speakers speak truthfully as when
they speak falsely. The evil sought to be avoided by the duty to
correct is issuer avoidance of responsibility for statements by interposing a third party as speaker.3 2 To date, duty to correct cases
have considered this subterfuge only when the third party speaks
29. Id. at 966-72. For example, a corporation has a duty to correct if an agency
relationship exists between the source of the misstatement and the corporation, and the
statement is within the source's scope of employment. Id. at 968.
30. See id. at 963-66; see generally M. STEINBERG, supra note 12, at § 2.02 (discussing
duty to update).
31. See Bauman, supra note 7, at 966.
32. See generally id. at 969-70.
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falsely; but the reasoning is equally applicable when the statement is
true but becomes false. The duty to correct only deems an issuer to
be the speaker. After this step is complete, the situation is identical
to a duty to update. Therefore, when an attributable speaker makes
a statement, true or false, the issuer has made the statement. And,
because the issuer must update or correct its direct statements, so
should it have to update its attributed statements.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE

DUTY

TO CORRECT

The duty to correct will typically arise from the statements of
two distinct groups: corporate parties such as officers and employees, and extracorporate parties such as market analysts. Application
of the duty to correct is really just a study of the relationship between the information source, whether corporate or extracorporate,
and the corporation. The corporation has a duty to correct statements by those sources that are "attributable" to the corporation.
The "attributable to the corporation" standard and judicial recognition of a duty to correct dates to Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp." In that case Electronic Specialty Co. (ELS)
sought to enjoin a tender offer by International Controls Corp.
(ICC).3 4 ELS alleged that ICC failed to correct certain misleading
statements made during the pretakeover period, two of which statements appeared in the "Heard on the Street" column of the Wall
Street Journal and one in an announcement over the Dow Jones
Broad Tape.3 5 The three statements provide an almost academic
example of potential issuer liability for statements under both direct
and attributed speech theories. The first statement was the Wall
Street Journal "Heard on the Street" column.3 6 ICC could be held
liable only under a duty to correct theory since ICC was not the
source of the story. The second statement was an announcement
over the Dow Jones Broad Tape issued at the direction of the ICC
board.3 7 Liability could be directly imposed here since the issuer
spoke. The third statement was another "Heard on the Street" column which purported to quote Robert Vesco, president and largest
33. 295 F. Supp 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd in part, 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
34. Id. at 1066.

35. Id. at 1075-77.
36. The column appeared July 31, 1968, and reported that ICC owned approximately 5% of ELS and might make a tender offer. Neither statement was true: ICC
owned only 2.5% and its board had not authorized an offer. 295 F. Supp. at 1075.
37. The announcement appeared August 5, 1968, immediately after ELS announced
its merger with Carpenter Steel. Vesco announced that ICC had no plans for a tender
offer for ELS. Id. at 1076.
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stockholder of ICC. 8 Liability could be direct if Vesco spoke for
ICC; liability could be derivative if Vesco did not speak for ICC but
ICC was under a duty to correct his statements.
ELS contended that these three statements were misrepresentations and an attempt to force down the price of ELS stock. ICC
contended that the statements were either true or at least not misleading when made. The district court found that each of the three
statements misled both ELS and the public regarding ICC's intention to make a tender offer and held ICC liable. 9
Thefirst statement. The district court found ICC under a duty to
correct the first "Heard on the Street" column that published an
incorrect report of ICC's holdings in ELS. The district court did not
discuss what relationship existed between ICC and Dan Dorfman,
the author of the column; rather, the court simply stated that ICC
was liable for the statement because ICC knew of it and was aware of
its effect on the market.4"
The second statement. ICC was held liable for the second statement, the Broad Tape announcement, because it misled as to ICC's
intention regarding its ELS holdings. Liability was direct since the
ICC board authorized the statement. 4 '
The third statement. ICC was liable for the third statement because it misled regarding ICC's intention as to its ELS holdings.
The liability theory for this statement was not clear. The statement
was a quote of Vesco. The district court did not explain the connection between the Vesco statement and the basis of ICC's liability. It
appeared that ICC was held liable because Vesco was acting either
on behalf of, or on apparent authority of, the corporation. The
court's only clear statement concerning Vesco's relationship with
ICC was that he was its "president, largest stockholder and domi42
nating force."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 43 First, it set aside the district court's factual finding that the
three statements misled the public and ELS.4 4 Second, it reversed
38. The column appeared August 15, 1968. It purported to quote Vesco as saying
that ICC was only planning to hold its ELS shares and not to acquire additional shares,
but that ICC would follow the ELS-Carpenter Steel merger and might, at some point,
seek to resume talks. Id. at 1077.
39. Id. at 1077-78.
40. Id. at 1078.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1074.
43. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
44. Id. at 951.
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the trial court's implication that Vesco's actions were those of ICC.
The appeals court stated that there was no basis in the record demonstrating that Vesco had usurped the board's role as spokesman
for ICC.

45

The court's reversal of the district court's findings of fact meant
that the Second Circuit decided the duty to correct issues by concluding that ICC had additional defenses to liability for the first and
third statements. ICC could not be liable for the first statement because there was no claim that ICC was its source. The court said,
"While a company may choose to correct a misstatement in the
press not attributable to it... we find nothing in the securities legislation requiring it to do so." 4 6 The court indicated that because
Vesco did not usurp the board's role as corporate spokesperson and
thus did not speak for the corporation, the corporation had no duty
regarding, his statements.4 7
In Electronic Specialty the Second Circuit considered the two
sources of a potential duty to correct: statements of corporate parties (Vesco, the president and largest shareholder) and statements
of extracorporate parties (the Wall Street Journal "Heard on the
Street" column). The court's treatment of extracorporate sources
was the more clear. It stated that the corporation need only correct
statements attributable to it. The court did not flesh out a definition
of "attributable" other than to indicate that the condition was not
met in this case.
The court was even less clear as to corporate parties. Its statement that Vesco did not speak for the corporation was conclusory
and not well considered. The bulk of the court's opinion was devoted to overturning the district court's factual findings. The opinion effectively indicates that an issuer would rarely, if ever, be under
a duty to correct statements of a corporate party, because the statements of the president, the largest stockholder and dominating
force (the trial court's characterization of Vesco) are not attributable
to the corporation.
A.

The Duty to Correct Statements of Corporate Parties

The SEC, in a 1986 release,4 8 considered the duty of issuers
45. Id.
46. Id. at 949.
47. Id. at 951.
48. Public Statements by Corporate Representatives, Exchange Act Release No.
20,560, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,120B (Jan. 13, 1984); 17 C.F.R. § 241.20560
(1986).
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regarding statements of corporate parties. It stated that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to all company
statements that can reasonably be expected to reach investors and
the trading markets.4 9 The Commission did not define "company
statements" but did gloss a definition when it stated that companies
and their spokespersons should be mindful of these obligations.5"
Use of "companies and their spokes[persons]" in amplification of
"all company statements" implies that the Commission places issuers under a duty only as to statements of corporate parties who were
authorized to speak. "Spokesperson" connotes someone with authorization to speak.
This concept of attribution as to a corporate party's statement
is too narrow. If the duty to correct is to work, it must contemplate
attribution to the corporation of statements by parties who are not
authorized to speak. The duty to correct holds issuers responsible
for statements that the public might reasonably believe the issuer
makes. Obviously, statements of corporate parties, even though unauthorized to speak, fall within this category.
A better approach is to base issuer duties regarding statements
of corporate parties on agency and tort theories. Under agency theory, when a corporate party speaks, that party speaks on behalf of,
as agent of, the corporation. The issuer has thus spoken, by its
agent, and can be held responsible for misstatements. The SEC, in
the 1986 release discussed above, adopts this theory of attribution.
In addition, tort theory imposes a duty on a corporation regarding statements made by corporate parties who are not authorized to
speak. Neither the SEC nor the courts have developed a theory
based on tort. The need to do so is clear. The duty to correct seeks
to hold issuers responsible for statements that the public reasonably
believes the issuer has made. When corporate parties speak, even
though not authorized, the public nevertheless may reasonably believe that they speak for the corporation; 5 ' thus, the issuer should be
under a duty to correct. The duty to correct must include some cohesive theory to attribute to a corporation the statements of corporate parties who the public reasonably believes speak for the
corporation.
The competing policies here are clear. On the one hand rests
protection of the public from the risk of trading on misinformation.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Bauman, supra note 7, at 969.
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On the other rests the issuer's burden in policing statements of its
employees. A rule that attributes all statements to the issuer goes
too far given the number of employees a public company can have.
Moreover, reasonable investors do not believe that every employee
speaks for an issuer. The balance of interests here is analogous to
the balance made by Congress in enacting section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

52

Section 20(a) attributes employee acts of securities law violations to employers. Controlling persons, e.g., employers, are made
jointly and severally liable with their employees for employee securities law violations unless the employer can show a defense of good
faith. The policies considered in this accommodation were the protection of the public versus the supervisory burdens on issuers.
Congress chose to provide a good faith defense to attribution of
acts, requiring the employer to establish that a system of diligent
supervision of employee acts is in place. 53
A similar balance should be struck in deciding which statements
of employees are attributable to corporations. If an issuer has implemented a diligent system to supervise employee statements, the
issuer ought to be able to avoid attribution of employee statements.
Such a system should include supervision of employees by specifying who is not authorized to speak and designating persons as
spokespersons who review press releases and who monitor corporate developments and disseminate them widely and promptly.
When such procedures are in place, the public will know who speaks
for the corporation, the public will be informed, and investors will
not be able to reasonably rely on unauthorized statements.5 4
Application of this analysis to duty to correct situations has
been suggested by commentators, 5 5 but no court has firmly embraced it. In In Re Warner Communications Securities Litigation56 a district court, while approving a class action settlement, favored this
approach to the duty to correct statements of corporate parties.
The court stated that plaintiffs might prevail by showing that the
corporate defendant lacked adequate procedures to ensure dissemination of correct information.

52.
53.
54.
55.

15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982).
See M. STEINBERG, supra note 12, at § 10.04.
See Bauman, supra note 7, at 969-70.
Id. at 968-69.

56. 618 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1985).

57. Id. at 752.
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The Duty to Correct Statements of ExtracorporateParties

Cases following Electronic Specialty have added content to the
definition of which extracorporate statements are "attributable to
the corporation." The District Court for the Southern District of
New York, in Zucker v. Sable,58 came markedly close to holding that
no statements are attributable to the corporation-i.e., the issuer has
no duty to correct.
In that case, the issuer, Union, issued a press release announcing the filing of an investigational new drug application with the
Food and Drug Administration.5 9 Plaintiffs alleged two material
omissions. First, plaintiffs claimed that Union in its press release
should have defined "investigational" and specifically should have
included the information that it may take as long as several years
from the time an investigational application is filed until the product
is approved for sale in the public market.6" The court rejected this
claim and concluded that the plaintiff could not rely on his ignorance of the meaning of "investigational" and then impose liability
on the defendants when the impact of the event was not as beneficial
as the plaintiff might have hoped.6 ' Second, plaintiffs alleged a failure by Union to timely correct reports of the original press release
that appeared in various financial journals and that omitted the
word "investigative." 6 2 The court rejected this claim as well. The
court stated that when an error in ajournal is not attributable to the
defendants it is unreasonable to require the defendants to search
out and correct errors in publications. 6"
The court reasoned that a contrary rule would require that the
defendants examine every financial publication to ascertain whether
the reports misinterpreted Union's accurate press release. This requirement, the court said, would place issuers under an insurmountable burden not required by law. 6'
This holding is a narrow interpretation of which statements are
attributable to the corporation. The source of the financial publications' reports was the corporation. Therefore, this decision means
that as long as the corporation transmits true information to the financial community, the corporation cannot be held responsible for
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

426 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 663.
Id.
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failure to correct misreporting. This interpretation would mean
that the corporation is only responsible for misstatements that it
makes. Note that the financial community misreported only factual
material. This was not a situation in which the press drew incorrect
conclusions from issuer-released information.
The Second Circuit itself clarified the muddied waters of Electronic Specialty regarding attribution of statements by extracorporate
parties in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. 6 5 In that case the plaintiff
asserted that Liggett's practice of reviewing and correcting draft reports of securities analysts regarding the company's operations created a duty to correct those reports when the reports drew
inaccurate conclusions. 6 6 The district court summarily rejected this
claim under the authority of Electronic Specialty.6 7
The Second Circuit affirmed this conclusion as to the duty to
correct. It stated that Liggett had not placed its imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the analysts' projections. 68 The appeals
court first noted that Electronic Specialty, which created a duty to correct under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, was equally applicable
in a suit relying on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.6 9 The court announced several important factors in its conclusion that the statements of the securities analysts would not be attributed to Liggett:
1. The company examined and commented on a number of
reports, but its policy was to refrain from comments on earnings
forecasts.
2. Analysts were not made privy to the company's internal
projections.
3. Liggett's suggestions were limited to factual and descriptive
matters. There was no suggestion that analyst estimates coincided
with Liggett's internal estimates.
4. There was no assertion that Liggett left uncorrected any
factual statements it knew or believed were erroneous.70
The court's analysis distinguishes between factual and nonfactual matters. The court indicated that issuer comments solely on
factual matters did create a duty to correct these facts when errone65. 635 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 472 F. Supp 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (affirming dismissal by district court on duty to correct and one finding
of tipping, but reversing as to a second finding of tipping).
66. 472 F. Supp at 124.
67. Id. at 126.
68. 635 F.2d at 163.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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ously reported but did not create a duty to correct mistaken conclusions drawn from these factual matters.
After the Second Circuit found that Liggett was not under a
duty to correct, it considered Liggett's liability under a tipping theory for pre-release review of analysts' reports. The court stated that
tipping liability lurks as a present danger when corporations engage
in review because management comments during the review may reveal material nonpublic information. 7 ' The court found that Liggett
had revealed inside information when Liggett confirmed, during a
private telephone call, that its earnings, yet unannounced, would be
lower.7 2 Liggett was accordingly held liable, not for failure to correct, but for tipping inside information.
The Second Circuit apparently chose to use tipping liability to
rectify abuses present when the issuer comments as to conclusions
drawn by extracorporate parties. However, this type of tipping lia74
73
bility does not survive Chiarella v. United States and Dirks v. SEC.
Chiarella and Dirks establish that tip liability accrues only when
the tipper personally gains from giving the tip and the tippee knows
that the tipper is breaching a fiduciary duty in making the tip. 75 In
the case of a tip to a market analyst the quid pro quo for the tipper is
not apparent. Additionally, it will not generally be apparent to the
analyst that a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred. Since tip liability does not survive in this setting, it is time to recanvass the propriety of issuer review of extracorporate parties' reports.
Another, opposite, view of attribution was adopted by the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon in Green v.
Jonhop, Inc. 76 This court announced by far the most expansive duty
to correct. It said that the corporation must correct omissions or
material misrepresentations made about it "when it learns of such
misstatements or omissions and is aware that their publication or
nonpublication will be misleading to members of the public."7 7
This is complete attribution to the corporation of all extracorporate
parties' statements of which the corporation becomes aware.
Liggett and Green are the two current views regarding the duty to
71. Id. at 163-64.
72. Id. at 167. The appellate court reversed the district court's finding of liability for
a second tip. The Second Circuit held that the second tip was not accompanied by scienter. Id.
73. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
74. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
75. Id. at 659.
76. 358 F. Supp 413 (D. Or. 1973).
77. Id. at 420.
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correct statements of extracorporate sources. Liggett, the more narrow, concludes that if issuers comment on solely factual matters,
then only the factual portions of extracorporate parties' statements
will be attributed to the corporation. Accordingly, the corporation
then faces a duty to correct only as to the erroneously reported factual matters. Green, however, attributes to the corporation any extracorporate statement of which it becomes aware.
Both tests have the virtue of applying familiar legal principles.
The Liggett test requires differentiation of factual and nonfactual
matters, a difficult but familiar legal process. The Green test requires
only a determination of whether the corporation knew of a misstatement. Determination of a party's knowledge is similarly a task that
the law is familiar with.
Unfortunately, both tests miss the mark of striking a proper balance between preventing the evil which the duty to correct seeks to
avoid and fostering information flow to the market. The evil sought
to be prevented is an issuer "end run" around its responsibility for
its statements. Concurrent with this prevention, though, the securities laws have a principal purpose of fostering disclosure. A strict
duty to correct would inhibit communication between issuers and
market analysts. This communication does have the benefit of providing information to the market.
Both the Green and Liggett tests move the balance too far to
either side. Green prevents the evil, but an issuer under a duty to
correct all extracorporate statements of which it learns can be expected to limit severely its contact with extracorporate parties. Liggett, on the other hand, draws a proper distinction between factual
and nonfactual matters, but goes too far when it allows the issuer to
review reports of extracorporate parties. Since the report may contain conclusions, the practice is fraught with danger.
The Second Circuit in Liggett, recognizing this shortcoming, decided to use tipping liability to police improper comments as to analysts' conclusions. However, since tip liability is either unavailable
or vastly more difficult to prove now than when Liggett was decided,
it is time to recanvass issuer review of reports. Because tipping liability cannot police abuses here, issuer review of extracorporate parties' statements must be disallowed if issuers want to continue to
limit their duty to correct to solely factual matters. When an issuer
either discusses nonfactual conclusions or reviews a report which
contains nonfactual matters, the courts should attribute all statements of an extracorporate party to the corporation, and the corpo-
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ration would thus incur an obligation to correct the whole of that
party's statements.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This comment suggests a framework for analyzing the duty to
correct. The framework borrows heavily from concepts applicable
to the duty to update and controlling person liability. The suggested framework is as follows (Note: these conditions are
cumulative):
Step 1. Has the issuer made, by attribution, an earlier
statement?
(a) If the speaker was a corporate party:
(i) Is the party an agent of the corporation?
Yes: attribution, go to Step 2.
No: proceed.
(ii) For a party not an agent ask: Has the corporation established and diligently maintained a system that ensures dissemination of correct information?
Yes: no attribution, condition not met.
No: attribution, go to Step 2.
(b) If the speaker is an extracorporate party:
(i) Has the corporation had discussions with the speaker
concerning matters in the statement?
Yes: proceed.
No: no attribution, condition not met.
(ii) Has the corporation limited its communications with
the party to factual matters?
Yes: attribute all factual matters of statement.
No: attribute the entirety of the statement.
Step 2. Has the earlier statement become false? (Note that this
step assumes that false as well as true statements are attributed at
Step 1. This is a change from the duty to correct as previously
phrased, which has only attributed statements that were false when
made.)
Yes: proceed.
No: no duty to correct.
Step 3. Is the change material?
Yes: proceed.
No: no duty to correct.
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Step 4. Are investors reasonable in relying on the continuing
accuracy of the earlier statement?
Yes: duty to correct.
No: no duty to correct.
The recent growth of the securities analysis industry and purposeful attempts by issuers to keep analysts informed (hoping to
buoy equity prices and ward off takeover threats) are two trends that
have greatly increased the number of statements by extracorporate
parties. Thus, the need for a new standard has become even more
important and will continue to do so. The contours of the duty to
correct are ill-defined. The area is ripe for litigation. The duty to
correct as it relates to statements of extracorporate parties is perhaps the most fertile for future litigation.
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